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Historical regulation of Victoria’s water sector: 




This paper analyses the role of government failure in Victoria’s water sector between
1905 and 1984 as evidenced in the rise of in-stream salinity. It will be shown that high
levels of salinity can, in part, be attributed to regulatory failure for two reasons. First,
the method of water allocation, a compulsory minimum charge with the marginal cost
of water being zero, encouraged over watering, resulting in increased water tables via
groundwater recharge. Second, the government did not provide adequate ﬁnance for









The economic impact of irrigation on in-stream salinity has become one of
the major challenges facing the Australian agricultural sector in recent decades.
As a result, substantial public funds have been invested into schemes, such as
the 
 
Salinity and Drainage Strategy
 




 (1996), and the 
 
National
Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality
 
 (2000), intended to limit the continued
expansion of salinity on land and its intrusion into waterways. Numerous
studies, undertaken by public agencies and scholars, have investigated the
causes and effects of salinity and future policy options to reduce projected
increases (Conacher and Conacher 1995; Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial













. 2004). These studies have contributed to a more comprehensive under-
standing of the salinity problem and policy options available to minimise
continued damage. However, only a very few of them have acknowledged the
impact of historical institutional choices on salinity outcomes (Conacher and




. 2004; Pannell 2005). Moreover, none
explores the connection between historical institutional frameworks used to
allocate and price water and salinity increases. This paper ﬁlls part of this gap by
analysing how institutional frameworks used in Victoria’s water sector between
1905 and 1984 contributed to the salinity problem now faced by that state.
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The methodology uses theoretical models that explain the potential pitfalls
of public policy, referred to as government failure, to analyse effects of water-
sector administration on salinity outcomes. Evidence of government failure is
illustrated in the effects of derived externalities, that is, in-stream salinity.
In-stream salinity is a classic externality that, according to economic theory,
can only be rectiﬁed by government intervention, such as Pigovian taxes. Taxes
act to increase input prices and align private and social costs of resource use.
Evidence presented in this study suggests that policymakers knew of the
perverse incentives created by underpricing water at the margin but did not
intervene to alter the pricing system. In addition, successive governments did
not provide ﬁnance for the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission
(SRWSC) to invest in infrastructure to reduce the release of saline drainage
water into river systems.
Recent interstate efforts, particularly the 
 
Salinity and Drainage Strategy
 
(1988), have acted to reduce the historical problem of underinvestment in
salinity mitigation. This strategy provides ﬁnancial incentives for states to
construct salinity interception and drainage diversion schemes. This acts to
reduce salinity intrusion into river systems, particularly the Murray River, by
making individual states’ in-stream salinity contributions more transparent.
Transparency is achieved by allocating salinity credits and debits in both
monetary and electrical conductivity (EC) units recorded on an interstate
salinity register. Credits and debits are adjusted annually in line with changes
in activities that will affect in-stream salinity levels such as the construction
of infrastructure to divert drainage water. As a result, this agreement encourages
investment in salinity reduction programs.
The plan of this paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the methodology of
government failure applied in this study. Section 3, details the link between
the institutional arrangement administered by the SRWSC and the rise of
salinity during its existence as evidence of government failure. Section 4 offers
some brief concluding remarks.
 
2. Government failure methodology
 
Traditionally, economists argued markets were unable to efﬁciently allocate
and price natural resources because of endemic market failure. In recent decades,
scholars have identiﬁed possible negative outcomes of political regulation,
broadly labelling this government failure. Three main approaches can be used
to analyse government failure: the public choice view identiﬁed primarily in
capture literature (Downs 1957; Olson 1965; Stigler 1971, 1974; Mueller





. 2005); and the taxonomy view (Wolf 1979, 1987; Wallis and
Dollery 1995).
The ﬁrst two models share a rational-choice approach to examine the
political process and both are linked with sceptical views toward political
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Nevertheless, they differ in their analysis of why such failures occur in the
public sector. Speciﬁcally, the capture school argues self-interest of all actors
in the political system allows special interest groups to manipulate public
policy outcomes to elicit favourable regulation, creating previously unavailable
rents. However, Austrian political economy claims intervention fails not because
of deception but because well-intentioned bureaucrats and politicians are
subject to radical ignorance. This creates a divergence between actual and





The third of these approaches, referred to here as the taxonomy view, is
different from the above two views because it analyses government failure
based on economic conditions used to identify market failure (Wolf 1979,
1987). This methodology creates a framework to compare shortcomings of both
markets and governments by evaluating them on the same grounds: efﬁciency
and distributional equity. Therefore, while markets fail due to externalities,
monopoly (or increasing returns), market imperfections and distributional
inequality, the taxonomy mirrors these failures in the government sector
labelling them: internalities, redundant and rising costs, derived externalities
and distributional inequality (Wolf 1979, 1987). Internalities are the goals
applied within non-market (government) organisation to guide, regulate, and
evaluate agencies and their personnel performance (Wolf 1979, 1987). However,
these goals are not stringently tied to proﬁt and loss criteria, and nor are they
linked clearly to agency purpose. As a result, internalities affect non-market
activities as externalities affect market activities causing divergence between
actual and socially preferred outcomes (Wolf 1979). Redundant and rising
costs are the tendency for non-market production to take place within the
production possibility frontier and for cost functions to rise over time (Wolf
1979, 1987). This results in non-market failure because agencies ignore
opportunities to lower cost functions and increase productivity resulting in
technical inefﬁciencies. Derived externalities are the unanticipated side-effects
of the non-market sector’s attempts to correct market failure. These occur
because of strong political pressure, short time horizons and high time discount
rates by political actors that create demand for intervention before there is
adequate knowledge or time to consider potential side-effects (Wolf 1979,
1987). Therefore, political actors tend to overlook potential externalities.
Distributional inequalities, indexed on power or income, increase demand for
some factors and skills at the expense of others. This taxonomy methodology is
used in the analysis presented here. The main argument centres on identiﬁcation
of derived externalities in the form of in-stream salinity.
 
3. The State Rivers and Water Supply Commission (SRWSC) and salinity
 
The SRWSC was a statutory corporation created under the 1905 Water Act.
Its aim was twofold: ﬁrst, to centralise control over water ﬁnancing arrangements
and overcome large economic losses resulting from decentralised water
administration of previous decades. Second, to promote rapid growth of the 
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irrigation sector that would stimulate economic development. In turn, this
resulted in an acceleration of both irrigation and in-stream salinity proportionate
to expansion of the sector for two reasons. First, the method of water allocation
under the SRWSC, characterised by a minimum compulsory charge, with no
volumetric charge, encouraged farmers to use more water than was socially
optimal. Second, successive governments did not provide adequate ﬁnance to
reduce the ﬂow of saline drainage water into river systems. Because of these
factors, the extent of salinity experienced in Victoria was higher than it would
have been if the institutional framework had been more efﬁcient in water
allocation and ﬁnancing arrangements.
Water allocation under the SRWSC was in the form of a water right
assigned to each property. Water rights were assigned based on a one for one
principle; that is for every acre determined suitable for irrigation, users were
allocated one acre-foot of water. A water right had two associated features:
ﬁrst, it could not be sold separately from the land to which it allocated. Second,
as noted, it was accompanied by a minimum compulsory charge requiring
farmers to pay for a predetermined, minimum quantity of water regardless of
whether they used it or not. Therefore, the marginal cost of water to farmers
was zero. On the other hand, the marginal social cost of water was positive,
as its use contributed to the rise of salinity by rising water tables and added
saline groundwater discharge into river systems. Because the marginal private
cost was less than the marginal social cost, farmers had an incentive to use
more water than was socially optimal.
The link between over-watering and on-farm irrigation salinity in the form
of high water tables was recognised as early as 1912. In that year, the SRWSC
annual report noted ‘excessive use of water by irrigators has caused a rise in
the soil water-level, which in a few scattered areas has come so near the
surface as to cause an accumulation of alkali through evaporation’ (SRWSC




. 1933; SRWSC 1937/38). By the late 1930s, the connection between the
compulsory charge and problems of over-watering were ﬁrmly established. In
1937, ﬁndings of a Royal Commission tabled in parliament stated, ‘A . . . defect
of the system of water rights is the natural tendency on the part of irrigators
to use the quantity of water for which they are required to pay, irrespective of its




. 1937, p. 24). This Royal Commission
claimed excessive water use was encouraged by the one to one allocation
principle noted above. It argued this system was inherently inﬂexible because
buyers could not determine the quantity of water they required from year to
year. Inﬂexibility had led to higher than average annual allocations, necessary
only during drought years, becoming the standard volume allotment even in
normal rainfall years.
Based on this assessment, the 1937 Royal Commission recommended that
parliament alter the method of water provision to avoid over-allocation problems.
It suggested replacement of compulsory minimums with volumes determined
by individual landowners. This voluntary contracting system included a 
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volumetric charge for water based on the consumption of one acre-foot. For
each acre-foot consumed, farmers would be charged a ﬂat per unit rate deter-





farmers would still be required to pay for the entire annual contracted
amount at the unit charge regardless of whether they used all the water or
not. As a result, this proposal did not effectively increase the marginal cost of
water to farmers. Its only advantage was that farmers were now able to opt
out of irrigation by choosing not to enter a contract for water supply or to
reduce (increase) the amount of water being delivered thereby limiting the
degree of over-use. Nevertheless, these recommendations were not incorporated
into legislation and the compulsory charge remained unaltered. This encouraged
the continued rise of water tables and groundwater recharge.
Rising salinity was also encouraged by successive governments’ refusal to
provide the SRWSC with sufﬁcient funds for disposal of saline drainage water
away from river systems. In 1916, ﬁndings from a Royal Commission tabled
in parliament noted the importance of directing drainage water away from
river systems as a way of reducing in-stream salinity and improving water




. 1916). It recommended additional
government ﬁnance be allocated for investigations into the effectiveness of
diverting saline drainage water into drainage reservoirs. However, this ﬁnance
was not provided and the SRWSC could not undertake these investigations.
As a result, salinity investment focused on construction of drainage systems
to reduce on-farm salinity that directed saline drainage water into river systems.
Therefore, in-stream salinity continued to increase.
By 1937, increasing salinity levels in Victorian rivers had started to damage
infrastructure and reduce irrigation productivity. This led the SRWSC to
investigate methods for reducing the problem (SRWSC 1936/37). In the same
year, the 1937 Royal Commission recommended an increase in public invest-
ment for salinity mitigation works to divert saline drainage water to storage
lakes. It recommended that parliament make additional ﬁnance available for





However, no funds were forthcoming.
In the decades that followed, the SRWSC investigated methods to reduce in-
stream salinity including the construction of silt dams to divert drainage
water and the use of evaporation basins (SRWSC 1957/58). However, because
much of this work was investigative it did little to prevent further intrusion of
salinity into waterways. It was not until the 1960s that adequate funds were
available to ﬁnance off-site storage on a broad scale. The federal government
provided this funding in response to South Australian concerns about the
increasing costs of Murray River salination. Finance was allocated to state
water authorities for construction of off-site disposal schemes to reduce
salinity in the river (SRWSC 1967/68). In later years, off-site drainage water
disposal became an essential part of interstate salinity reduction programs,
particularly the 
 
Salinity and Drainage Strategy
 
 (Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial
Council 1999, 2000). 
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Prior to the 1960s, lack of state funding for drainage disposal may have
been the result of two exogenous shocks: the Great Depression (1930s) and
World War II (1939–1945). These shocks would have acted to reduce funding
available for this type of investment because of changes in government
ﬁnancing priorities. Nevertheless, these events were accompanied by a change
in economic policy that emphasised Keynesian demand-side management.
Therefore, investment in drainage diversion schemes would have been consistent
with the overall thrust of public policy for two reasons. First, Keynesian
economic management encouraged large-scale government investment in public
works to stimulate economic growth by increasing employment. Infrastructure
construction to remove saline drainage water would have created employment
while reducing in-stream salinity to some degree.
Second, investment in the war effort would have taken priority during the
conﬂict, reducing funding for removal of drainage water in irrigation areas.
However, once the war ended, government policy was directed at employment
creation for returned soldiers. A major part of this policy was the establishment
of soldier settlement schemes in irrigated areas. These schemes, ﬁnanced by
government loans to solider settlers, increased public investment in the water
sector. Figure 1 supports the importance of this post-war investment policy
showing a sharp spike in per capita subsidy for country water supply in 1944/45.
An essential requirement of these schemes was the maintenance of land
and water quality to stabilise output levels and incomes. However, on-farm
and in-stream salinity would have acted to reduce productivity of these
settlements, lowering incomes and the ability of settlers to ﬁnance loans.
Based on these considerations, it is reasonable to argue that employment and
productivity  beneﬁts of public investment in drainage water disposal would
have been higher than the costs. In turn, it could be claimed that lack of
Figure 1 Per capita subsidy for country water supply from 1939/40 to 1978/79.
Source: SRWSC 1939/40 to 1978/79. 
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ﬁnance for these works reduced the overall beneﬁts of these policy initiatives
to some degree.
Nevertheless, while the government did not provide funds to mitigate in-stream
salinity, it continued to invest in irrigation expansion, the costs of which were
not recouped from compulsory charge revenue. As a result, Victorian taxpayers
were subsidising the irrigation industry (Figures 1, 2). The continued expansion
in irrigation without corollary expenditure on effective drainage disposal
increased in-stream salinity over the following decades. Comprehensive
monitoring of in-stream salinity on multiple Victorian rivers was not undertaken
during these decades. However, one set of data collected by the Murray–
Darling Basin Commission between 1939 and 2003 measured salinity levels
in the Murray River at Morgan, South Australia. Morgan is located between
lock one and two on the river, just before the Morgan–Whyalla pipeline supplying





, measure the effectiveness of these schemes based on
measurements at Morgan. The aim is to maintain salinity levels here at 800
EC, the World Health Organisations upper limit for drinking water, 95 per cent
of the time.
The application of a simple ordinary least-squares linear trend line to these
data shows an upward trend (Figure 3). Large variations in these data make
it difﬁcult to prove the existence of an underlying trend. However, a more
detailed examination of salinity levels by Cunningham and Morton (1983)
supports the claim that salinity was increasing during this period. The Cun-
ningham and Morton (1983) study uses the same data set and applies a simple
Figure 2 Irrigation costs absorbed by the Victorian State Government.
Note: The increases in amounts in 1959/60 was the result of additional construction which
could not be undertaken by local authorities because they required heavy expenditure on
headworks with capacities much above the immediate requirements of the areas served
(SRWSC 1959/60).
Source: Harris 2002, 139–141. 
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statistical model using chloride concentrations rather than EC units to analyse
salinity measurements. They concluded that, apart from the peaks, there was
a general upward trend in the data over and above that associated with a
decline in water ﬂow during the period (Cunningham and Morton 1983). The
ﬁndings should be interpreted with caution given the proportion of salinity
contributed by New South Wales irrigation areas cannot be disaggregated.
Therefore, it is difﬁcult to conclude what share of the increase was attributable
to Victorian government failure as identiﬁed above. However, it is possible to
argue, based on the evidence presented above, lack of action by the Victorian
government to adequately deal with irrigation salinity problems identiﬁed
over 1939–1984 almost certainly contributed to the upward trend observed to
some extent. In turn, this suggests that, in part, in-stream salinity increases
could be the result of government failure in water sector administration.
Evidence provided in this study supports the contention that at least part of
the salinity problem experienced in Victoria today is because of government
failure as deﬁned by Wolf (1979, 1987) for two reasons. First, the government
did not alter the water allocation system that underpriced water at the
margin, encouraging over use. Over-watering increased on-farm salinity by
inducing rising water tables and in-stream salinity via groundwater recharge.
This supports Wolf’s (1987) deﬁnition of government failure because the agency
responsible for creating the derived externality did not alter its behaviour to
prevent or limit the externality.
Second, successive governments did not provide ﬁnance for construction
of large-scale schemes to prevent the ﬂow of saline drainage water into river
systems. Victorian economic development was underpinned by irrigation-
sector expansion where large-scale public infrastructure investments overcame
Figure 3 Murray River salinity levels at Morgan, South Australia 1938–2003.
Note: R
2 is 0.0432; t statistic is 1.70. Trend line is estimated using ordinary least squares regression.
Source: www.mdbc.gov.au 2003. 
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private sector underinvestment. Wolf’s (1987) taxonomy approach identiﬁes
the derived externalities that can result from these interventions as a class of
government failure. In this context, lack of ﬁnance for construction of off-
site storage of saline drainage water ﬁts this deﬁnition of government failure.
It was not until the 1960s when federal government funding became available
to construct drainage diversion schemes that any real progress was made to
reduce in-stream salinity. However, it was still another 20 years before funding
was sufﬁcient for broad scale application of these programs. Combined, these
factors provide evidence in support of the claim that delayed action to effec-




The evidence outlined above supports to the argument that high levels of
in-stream salinity currently experienced in Victoria are, in part, the result of
past government failure in water sector administration. Evidence shows that
water allocation under the SRWSC based on the application of a compulsory
charge encouraged over-watering by underpricing water at the margin. In
turn, the knowledge that excessive water use was leading to water table rises
in various irrigation areas was well recognised by 1912. However, while alter-
native methods of allocation and pricing were recommended, there was no
change in government policy.
The evidence also shows that while investment in storage capacity and
associated infrastructure continued to increase, there was no ﬁnance provided
for effective removal of saline drainage water. As a result, saline drainage
water ﬂowed back into river systems, increasing in-stream salinity. In recent
years, interstate initiatives, particularly the 
 
Salinity and Drainage Strategy
 
 that
increased ﬁnance for comprehensive salinity mitigation schemes have gone
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